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Anorexia: Can Parity be Achieved?
Abbey Derechin
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the statutory landscape of mental health parity in the United
States. The lens of this Note is through the mental illness of anorexia. Parity laws mandate
analogous limitations between mental and physical illness. Therefore, because anorexia
has many physical manifestations, it serves as a nice juxtaposition to physical illnesses.
This Note will argue for broad interpretation of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act (MHPAEA) through comparative analysis of counterpart statute, the California
Mental Health Parity Act (CMHPA). It will explore how courts have interpreted the
CMHPA broadly to suggest that the MHPAEA should be interpreted the same way.
Keywords: mental health, anorexia, statutory interpretation, California, CMHPA,
MHPAEA, eating disorder
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INTRODUCTION
Eating disorders are alarmingly prevalent and dangerous. Historians and
psychologists report that people have exhibited symptoms of anorexia for thousands of
years.1 Evidence suggests that genetics can place people at a higher risk of developing an
eating disorder.2 For instance, family studies have determined that anorexia is largely
familial with incidence rates more common amongst family members than the general
population.3 However, insurance companies consistently treat mental illnesses, specifically
anorexia, with disparate coverage in comparison to traditional physical illnesses. Over
many years, Congress has enacted multiple parity laws, such as the Mental Health Parity
Act (MHPA) and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA), to
remedy this inconsistency in coverage. States have also enacted their own parity laws.4
Nonetheless, in practice, the disparity still exists due to narrow interpretations of the
Acts. The aim of this Note is to show that, in order to meet the legislature’s intent of
reaching parity between mental healthcare and medical/surgical healthcare, the MHPAEA
should be read broadly as including residential treatment as medically necessary treatment
in severe cases of anorexia.
Part I of this Note will introduce the mental illness of anorexia, which will serve as
the analytical lens to interpret parity laws. Part I will also discuss the health consequences
and mortality rates associated with anorexia. Part II of this Note will lay out the past and
present statutory landscape of mental health parity laws in the United States. It will discuss
the first federal parity law, the MHPA, and outline the goals and the shortcomings of this
law. Part II will then examine the current federal parity law, the MHPAEA and its
shortcomings.
Part III will overview an exemplary state parity law. The California Mental Health
Parity Act (CMHPA) was chosen for analysis because its broad language and interpretation
achieves far more parity than the current implementation of the MHPAEA. Part IV will
compare the similar goals of the CMHPA and the MHPAEA as both Acts aim to provide
parity in treatment coverage between mental illness and physical illness. Part V analyzes
how the CMHPA has been highly successful at achieving parity through case law and
suggests that the MHPAEA should be interpreted consistent with the CMHPA. Finally,
Part VI will introduce suggestions for the future.
I.

ANOREXIA

Historically, anorexia nervosa has been one of the mental disorders most impacted
by unequal insurance coverage.5 This Note will focus on anorexia because of the
Anorexia Nervosa, NAT’L EATING DISORDERS ASS’N, https://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/learn/byeating-disorder/anorexia (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
2
What Are Eating Disorders?, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/eatingdisorders/what-are-eating-disorders (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
3
Beth A. Brunalli, Anorexia Killed Her, But The System Failed Her: Does the American Insurance System
Suffer from Anorexia?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 583, 589 (2005–2006).
4
For example, Public Act 99-480 in Illinois.
5
Brunalli, supra note 3, at 586.
1
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abundance of case law regarding treatment coverage for this common and deadly mental
illness. More specifically, this Note will focus on residential treatment for anorexia, which
is an intermediate level of treatment.
Eating disorders are one of the deadliest mental illnesses.6 Eating disorders do not
discriminate; they impact people of all ages, races, sexual orientations, and genders.7
Messages promoting weight loss and glamorizing skinniness are pervasive throughout
society. In fact, this messaging is so prevalent that a study found that 81% of 10-year-olds
are afraid of becoming fat and 42% of first through third grade girls want to be skinner.8
While there are a variety of eating disorders, the most common are binge eating disorder,
bulimia nervosa, and anorexia nervosa. Anorexia is by far the deadliest eating disorder.9
Anorexia is an eating disorder characterized by excessive dieting, severe weight loss,
distorted body image, and a pathological fear of gaining weight.10 Some people with
anorexia also engage in over exercising as well as binge and purge behaviors.11 Under the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5), the following criteria
must be met in order to be diagnosed with anorexia:
i.

Restriction of energy intake relative to requirements leading to a
significantly low body weight in the context of age, sex, developmental
trajectory, and physical health;
ii. Intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though
underweight; [and]
iii. Disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is
experienced, undue influence of body weight or shape on selfevaluation, or denial of the seriousness of the current low body weight.12
Even if all the criteria of the DSM-5 diagnosis of anorexia are not met, an individual
can still have a serious eating disorder, such as atypical anorexia.13 Atypical anorexia
includes those who are not medically underweight but still meet all other requirements for
typical anorexia.14 There is no difference in the medical and psychological impact of classic
anorexia and atypical anorexia.15 Further, less than 6% of people who are diagnosed with
eating disorders are medically underweight.16 Unfortunately, people with larger bodies are
6

Id.
What are Eating Disorders?, NAT’L EATING DISORDERS ASS’N, https://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org
(last visited Mar. 17, 2022).
8
Eating Disorder Statistics, NAT’L ASS’N OF ANOREXIA NERVOSA AND ASSOCIATED DISORDERS,
https://anad.org/get-informed/about-eating-disorders/eating-disorders-statistics/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2021).
9
Jon Arcelus, Alex J. Mitchell, Jackie Wales & Søren Nielsen, Mortality rates in patients with anorexia
nervosa and other eating disorders, 68 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 724, 728 (2011).
10
Feeding and Eating Disorders, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets (follow
hyperlink, scroll down, click on “Eating Disorders”) (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
11
NAT’L EATING DISORDER ASS’N, supra note 1.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
NAT’L ASS’N OF ANOREXIA NERVOSA AND ASSOCIATED DISORDERS, supra note 9.
7
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less likely to be diagnosed with eating disorders than those with smaller bodies.17 This
creates a huge issue when eating disorder treatment relies solely on weight-based
classifications.
A. Health Consequences
Anorexia is ruthless and unforgiving. Anorexia leads to medical complications that
can involve every single organ system.18 Some of the most severe anorexia complications
are related to malnutrition. For instance, anorexia involves consuming fewer calories,
which causes the individual’s body to begin breaking down its own tissue to utilize as
fuel.19 Some of the first tissue that the body breaks down is muscle, including the heart.20
The breakdown of heart muscle can lead to significant consequences such as reduced heart
rate, pulse and blood pressure, which can result in heart failure.21 Additionally, impaired
immune function and impaired kidney function can also result from severe weight loss and
malnutrition,22 which can interfere with the human body’s capability to sustain a safe blood
glucose level, leading to recurrent hypoglycemia or even death.23 Furthermore, consuming
fewer calories can also lead to hair falling out and dry skin. 24 In order to conserve bodily
warmth when starved, the body can develop fine hair, called lanugo.25 Other health
consequences associated with anorexia are the following: fainting, dizziness, irregular
heartbeat, anemia, amenorrhea, severe constipation, bloating, osteoporosis, infertility, and
hormonal suppression.26
These severe health consequences lead to an alarmingly high mortality rate for eating
disorders. Opioid addiction is the only mental health disorder that has a higher mortality
rate than eating disorders.27 One study found that anorexia had a higher mortality rate than
both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.28 There is about one death every fifty-two
minutes, or 10,200 deaths every year from eating disorders.29 Around 9% of the US
population, which is 28.8 million people, will have an eating disorder at some point in their
lives.30 26% of people with eating disorders will at some point attempt suicide31 and one
in five anorexics die by suicide.32 Among anorexics, the mortality rate is an alarming
17

Id.
Eating Disorder Statistics, Health Consequences, NAT’L EATING DISORDERS ASS’N,
https://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/health-consequences (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Mike Daly, Ronald M. LaRocca & Michael Pertschuk, M.D., Learning the Language: Eating Disorder
Claims Pose Multiple Challenges Under Health Insurance Policies, FOR THE DEFENSE 45, 45–47 (2015).
23
Id.
24
NAT’L EATING DISORDERS ASS’N, supra note 2.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, supra note 3.
28
Arcelus, supra note 9, at 729.
29
NAT’L ASS’N OF ANOREXIA NERVOSA AND ASSOCIATED DISORDERS, supra note 8.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
DELOITTE ACCESS ECONOMICS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COST OF EATING DISORDERS IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: A REPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC TRAINING INITIATIVE FOR THE PREVENTION OF
EATING DISORDERS AND THE ACADEMY FOR EATING DISORDERS (June 2020) at 27,
18
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10%.33 “The mortality rate associated with anorexia nervosa is twelve times higher than
the death rate of all causes of death for females 15–24 years old.”34 With such severe health
consequences and high rates of mortality, it is clear that treatment for anorexics is
medically necessary.
B. Treatment Methods
Eating disorders can be treated in a variety of different settings depending on the
severity of the illness.35 Some common treatment methods include inpatient care, partial
hospital care, residential treatment, intensive outpatient programs, and general outpatient
services.36 The primary goals for both the physician and the patient in treating anorexia are
to restore a healthy weight, treat physical complications, enhance patient’s motivations to
engage in healthy eating patterns, treat psychiatric conditions, and engage family for
support and prevent relapse.37 This Note focuses on residential treatment for anorexia and
the litigation surrounding it. Many insurance companies attempt to exclude coverage of
residential treatment.38 Thus, due to the disparity in the way health insurance companies
cover mental and physical sicknesses, patients with mental illness often must pay for their
own therapy out-of-pocket.
Unfortunately, there has not been extensive research concerning the efficacy of
anorexia treatments. However, the University of Sheffield recently conducted a study
analyzing the success of residential treatment,39 finding it effective for early intervention
of severe anorexia.40 Residential treatment is an intermediate, formal level of care
characterized by twenty-four hour care and supervision, primarily for medically stabilized
patients, with a focus on providing psychological therapy.41 Patients participate in
residential treatment through individual, group, family, and nutritional counseling.42
Individuals at residential treatment facilities typically have very severe psychosocial
impairments, but may not need immediate medical services.43 Although, residential
treatment is extremely expensive, costing about $1,237 per day per individual on average
as of 2018–2019.44 In 2019, residential treatment for eating disorders in the United States

https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/economics/articles/social-economic-cost-eating-disorders-unitedstates.html.
33
NAT’L EATING DISORDER ASS’N, supra note 2.
34
Eating Disorder Statistics, S.C. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.state.sc.us/dmh/anorexia/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2021) (emphasis added).
35
Daly, LaRocca & Pertschuk, supra note 22, at 46.
36
Id.
37
WORK GROUP ON EATING DISORDERS, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH
EATING DISORDERS 1, 14 (3d ed. 2010).
38
Brunalli, supra note 3, at 591–95.
39
Kate Hiney-Saunders, Leah Ousley, Jeannette Caw, Emma Cassinelli & Glenn Waller, Effectiveness of
Treatment for Adolescents and Adults With Anorexia Nervosa in a Routine Residential Setting, 29 EATING
DISORDERS 2, 5 (2019).
40
Id. at 11.
41
DELOITTE ACCESS ECON. supra note 34, at 65.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 39.
44
Id.
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totaled about $796.3 million;45 treatment for individuals with anorexia made up $565.5
million of that amount.46
Patients with untreated anorexia typically have low motivation for recovery.47 In
health studies, longer length of stay at a residential treatment facility has been associated
with positive outcomes in patients with anorexia.48 Additionally, the American
Psychological Association stated that early discharges of patients with low motivation to
recover frequently leads to relapses and longer inpatient stays in the future. 49 Overall,
residential treatment of eating disorders is effective and should be utilized in medically
necessary circumstances.
II.

HISTORY OF MENTAL HEALTH PARITY IN THE UNITED STATES

The following section provides background into the landscape of mental health parity
in the United States and comments on the circumstances that led to necessary statutory
intervention. Mental illness is extraordinarily common in the United States.50 51 However,
those suffering from mental illness have faced significant barriers in access to treatment
because healthcare plans frequently place limitations on mental healthcare coverage.52
Prior to the passage of parity laws, mental health coverage under health insurance plans
was typically disparate from medical/surgical coverage in five principal ways.53 First, the
number of days a patient’s care is covered in the hospital was substantially shorter for
mental healthcare.54 Second, the amount of coinsurance paid by the insurer for mental
healthcare was lower.55 Third, the quantity of covered visits to outpatient providers was
much lower for mental healthcare.56 Fourth, the amount of lifetime benefits for mental
healthcare differed substantially from medical/surgical benefits.57 Finally, annual
maximum out-of-pocket protections were vastly different.58 Parity laws have narrowed the
gap slightly, however, true parity has not yet been achieved.
This lack of parity between mental, medical, and surgical healthcare likely stems
from insurance companies’ fears that mental illness is expensive and difficult to treat.59
Admittedly, treating mental illness can be expensive. However, not treating mental illness
45

Id. at 40.
Id.
47
Matthew D. McHugh, Readiness for Change and Short–Term Outcomes of Female Adolescents in
Residential Treatment for Anorexia Nervosa, INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 602 (2007).
48
Id. at 604.
49
Id.
50
Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mentalillness.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
51
In 2019, approximately one in five adults received a mental illness diagnosis. Id.
52
Sara Noel, Parity in Mental Health Coverage: The Goal of Equal Access to Mental Health Treatment
Under the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 and Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, 26
HAMLINE L. REV. 377, 380 (2002).
53
JENNIFER A. NEISNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 96-827 EPW, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT OF 1996:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 1 (1998).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., id. at 2.
46
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can be just as expensive and can have catastrophic societal repercussions. According to the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in 1994, the
United States spent nearly $204 billion on untreated and undertreated mental illness.60 Most
of the expenses were in relation to direct treatment costs and lost productivity related to
illness or premature death.61 Nevertheless, the 1999 Surgeon General report found that
effective treatments exist for most mental disorders.62 Treatment for mental illness exists;
the issue here is access.63
The federal statutory landscape tends to encourage stigmatization of patients
suffering from mental illnesses. It prevents access by creating a narrative that treatment is
readily available—but only to those who can pay out of pocket. Although social acceptance
of persons with mental illness has increased in recent years, prejudice surrounding mental
illness is still alarmingly prevalent.64 In the United States, stigmas attached to mental illness
label mental patients as “dangerous” or “unpredictable.”65 Even though mental illnesses
are largely rooted in biology and are similar to many other medical conditions,66 the public
has consistently directed animus towards psychiatric patients.67
Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) in 1996 to attempt to
remedy the disparity between treatment of mental illness and physical illness. However,
the MHPA left out many vital provisions necessary to effectively reach parity with physical
illness treatment. In 2008, Congress replaced the MHPA and enacted the Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA).
A. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996
The MHPA constituted the first attempt at federal parity legislation.68 It applied to
employment-related group health plans and health insurance coverage offered in
connection with a group health plan.69 Congress codified the parity provisions of the
MHPA in section 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act), section 9812 of the
Code, and in section 712 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).70 The
MHPA prohibited group plans from implementing annual and lifetime dollar limits that are
more restrictive for mental health coverage than those placed on medical and surgical
coverage.71 On the surface, this provision seemed like a tangible step toward parity.
60

C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31657, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 2 (2004).
Id.
62
Id.
63
As of 2018, untreated mental illnesses cost the United States $300 billion annually. NAT’L ALL. ON
MENTAL ILLNESS, HEALTH REFORM & MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/getattachment/GetInvolved/NAMI-National-Convention/Convention-Program-Schedule/Hill-Day-2017/FINAL-Hill-Day-17Leave-Behind-all-(1).pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
64
Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at the
Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 50 TENN. L. REV. 47, 52 (2005).
65
Id.
66
AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, supra note 3.
67
Hensel, supra note 64.
68
RAMAYA SUNDARARAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33820, THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT: A LEGIS.
HIST. (2008).
69
FINAL RULES UNDER THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, (Nov. 13, 2013).
70
Id.
71
NEISNER, supra note 53, at 3.
61
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However, in practice, MHPA did not establish comprehensive parity between treatment of
mental and physical illnesses.72
For instance, the MHPA did not require equality between mental health coverage and
medical or surgical coverage in areas such as copayments or limits on inpatient days and
outpatient visits.73 The MHPA also did not apply to substance-use disorders.74 Further,
MHPA had two critical exemptions. First, employers with more than two people but less
than fifty were exempt from the bill.75 Second, the MHPA did not require employers to
provide mental health coverage.76 Instead, it only required that, if an employer provided
mental health coverage, there had to be parity with lifetime limits on surgical and medical
benefits.77 These limitations problematically allowed insurance plans to circumvent the
purpose of the law by charging higher copays and limiting annual covered inpatient and
outpatient visits.78 Generally, the MHPA was a step in the right direction. However, it was
clear that the MHPA did not accomplish the legislature’s ultimate goal of parity. New
legislation, The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), built upon the foundation laid by the MHPA in attempt
to achieve true parity.79
B. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008
In response to the failures of the MHPA, Congress enacted the second federal mental
health parity legislation, the MHPAEA.80 The MHPAEA expanded the requirements of the
MHPA to include both financial provisions and treatment limitations.81 It mandated parity
between the limitations that are placed on mental health treatment and medical/surgical
treatment.82 However, the MHPAEA maintained the two exemptions from the MHPA.
First, the MHPAEA still only applied to plans for private or public sector employers who
had more than 50 employees.83 Second, the MHPAEA did not require insurance plans to
provide mental health benefits; yet, if the plan does provide mental health benefits, the
insurance plan must comply with parity requirements of the MHPAEA.84 The Department
of Labor, Department of Treasury, and the Department of Health and Human Services (the
Departments) were tasked with publishing the interim final rules and the final rules for the
implementation of the MHPAEA.85
72

Noel, supra note 52, at 388–89.
Colleen L. Barry, Howard H. Goldman & Haiden A. Huskamp, Federal Parity in The Evolving Mental
And Addiction Care Landscape, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1009, 1010 (2016).
74
Id.
75
Noel, supra note 52, at 388.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 387.
78
Id.
79
John G. Kilgour, Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits Parity, 50 COMP. & BENEFITS
REV. 95, 98 (2019).
80
Id.
81
Craft v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 84 F. Supp. 3d 748, 750 (N. D. Ill. 2015).
82
Id.
83
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 (MHPAEA)
(2010), https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo10380/fsmhpaea.pdf.
84
Id.
85
Id.
73
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C. Interim Final Rules and Final Rules of the MHPAEA
The Departments released the interim final rules in February of 2010.86 The interim
final rules remained in effect until 2014, when the final rules were executed.87 The goal of
the interim final rules was to provide a framework for implementation and to clarify
possible areas of ambiguity in the MHPAEA.88
One of the most critical clarifications of the interim final rules was the application of
“treatment” to both “quantitative” and “nonquantitative” limitations. Quantitative
treatment limitations are conveyed numerically, such as a limitation on the number of
outpatient visits per year.89 Nonquantitative treatment limitations are those that are not
expressed numerically but otherwise limit the scope or duration of benefits.90 These two
concepts, and their importance, will be analyzed throughout the rest of this Note.
The interim final rules declared, and the final rules confirmed, that the parity
requirements of the MHPAEA applied to both quantitative and nonquantitative treatment
limitations.91 This is important because many mental health treatments can fall into the
nonquantitative category. The interim final rules provided a non-exhaustive list of
examples of nonquantitative treatment limitations including the following:
(A) Medical management standards limiting or excluding benefits based on
medical necessity or medical appropriateness, or based on whether the
treatment was experimental or investigative;
(B) Formulary design for prescription drugs;
(C) For plans with multiple network tiers (such as preferred providers and
participating providers), network tier design;
(D) Standards for provider admission to participate in a network, including
reimbursement rates;
(E) Plan methods for determining usual, customary, and reasonable charges;
(F) Refusal to pay for higher-cost therapies until it can be shown that a
lower-cost therapy is not effective (also known as fail-first policies or step
therapy protocols);
(G) Exclusions based on failure to complete a course of treatment; and
(H) Restrictions based on geographic location, facility type, provider
specialty, and other criteria that limit the scope or duration of benefits for
services provided under the plan or coverage.92
The key language for the purpose of this analysis is found in subsection (A): “medical
necessity or medical appropriateness.”

86

Barry, supra note 73, at 1011.
Final Rules, supra note 69.
88
Barry, supra note 73, at 1011.
89
INTERIM FINAL RULES UNDER THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5412 (Feb. 2, 2010).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 5436.
92
Id.
87
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The interim final rules further outlined that insurance providers must apply treatment
limitations on a classification-by-classification basis.93 The interim final rules laid out six
classifications and required parity of medical and surgical benefits and mental health
benefits within each classification.94 The classifications were as follows; (1) inpatient, innetwork; (2) inpatient, out-of-network; (3) outpatient, in-network; (4) outpatient, out-ofnetwork; (5) emergency care; and (6) prescription drugs.95 This means that if an insurance
plan provides coverage within one of the classifications for a medical/surgical condition,
the plan must also provide coverage for a mental health disorder within the same
classification. For instance, if an insurance plan provides benefits for outpatient, in network
medical/surgical coverage, it must also provide benefits for outpatient, in network mental
health services. The interim final rules provided necessary guidance on treatment
limitations. However, the interim final rules did not address the extent to which the scope
of services a plan offered for mental illness had to be analogous to medical/surgical
conditions.96
The Departments issued the final rules on November 13, 2013.97 The final rules were
largely similar to the interim final rules. The final rules maintained the six classifications
and the definition of quantitative and nonquantitative treatment limitations articulated in
the interim final rules.98 However, the final rules clarified and altered multiple provisions
of the interim final rules. For instance, the final rules explained that the examples of
nonquantitative treatment limitations in the interim final rules were illustrative, but not
exhaustive.99 Next, the final rules eliminated a provision in the interim final rules that
allowed nonquantitative treatment limitations that were based on “clinically appropriate
standards of care.”100 The final rules deemed this provision confusing and vulnerable to
abuse.101
The final rules also clarified that within the six broad classifications outlined in the
interim final rules, there could be subclassifications in certain circumstances.102 This
provision was necessary given the risk of insurance companies claiming that certain
benefits were outside of the six classifications and not subject to the final rules.103 For
instance, intermediate care levels such as partial hospitalization or residential treatment do
not fall neatly into one of the six categories.104 The final rules explicitly state that insurance
plans cannot exclude intermediate levels of care, such as intensive outpatient services,
residential treatment, and partial hospitalization.105 However, the final rules further qualify
that intermediate levels of care for both mental health benefits and medical/surgical care
93

Id. at 5412.
Id. at 5413.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 5412.
97
Gerald E. DeLoss, Laura Ashpole & Kelly Whelan, Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act Final
Rules: Limited Enforcement Options Don’t Overcome Unequal Treatment, 7 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. 75, 76
(2014).
98
Id. at 78.
99
Id. at 86.
100
Barry, supra note 73.
101
Id.
102
DeLoss, Ashpole & Whelan, supra note 97, at 84.
103
Id. at 84–85.
104
Id.
105
Final Rules, supra note 69, at 68247.
94
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must be applied consistently within the six classifications. The final rules give the
following example: “if a plan or issuer classifies care in skilled nursing facilities or
rehabilitation hospitals as inpatient benefits, then the plan or issuer must likewise treat any
covered care in residential treatment facilities for mental health or substance use disorders
as an inpatient benefit.”106 This example shows how the Departments intended intermediate
levels of care to be covered. Overall, the interim final rules and the final rules provided
much needed direction to how the language of the MHPAEA should be interpreted.
IV.

CALIFORNIA MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT

Most states enacted their own parity laws after the passage of MHPA in 1996.107
These state laws varied in scope and were limited to a subset of each state’s population of
privately insured citizens.108 California adopted one of the most expansive parity laws in
the country and exemplifies the most effective steps taken to achieve parity. Governor
Davis signed the California Mental Health Parity Act (CMHPA), also known as Assembly
Bill 88 (AB 88) into law in 1999.109 Prior to enacting the CMHPA, the California
legislature noticed that most private health insurance policies provided coverage for mental
illness at a significantly lower level than coverage for physical illnesses.110 The legislature
also found that this disparity in treatment between mental and physical illness resulted in
deficient treatment of mental illness, relapse, an increase in crime, an increase in
homelessness, and an increase in demands on the state budget.111
The CMHPA requires that every health plan that offers medical or surgical coverage
must in turn cover the diagnosis and medically necessary treatment of severe mental
illnesses.112 The language this Note will analyze is not current. The CMHPA was amended
recently and the updated language of the CMHPA is even more broad. However, since this
change was recent, much of the relevant case law interprets the old language of the
CMHPA. The old language of the CMHPA requires the same coverage for all medically
necessary treatment of severe mental illnesses as for medical conditions:
Every health care service plan contract issued, amended, or renewed on or
after July 1, 2000, that provides hospital, medical, or surgical coverage shall
provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically necessary treatment of
severe mental illnesses of a person of any age, and of serious emotional
disturbances of a child.113
This language is still relevant and useful because it is most analogous to the medically
necessary language from the MHPAEA. The new language is far more broad and arguably
not comparable to the MHPAEA. The expenses covered under the CMHPA include:
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outpatient services, inpatient hospital services, partial hospital services, and prescription
drugs (if the policy provides coverage for prescription drugs).114 These expenses covered
are analogous to the six classifications of care specified in the interim final rules and the
final rules of the MHPAEA. The language of the CMHPA declared that if an insurance
plan covers medical/surgical benefits, the plan must also provide coverage for the treatment
and diagnosis of medically necessary treatment of mental illness. Notably, the CMHPA
does not explicitly define “medically necessary.” The courts in California have interpreted
the language “medically necessary” in a broad manner, recognizing that medically
necessary treatments for mental illness and physical health may not be directly analogous.
Frequently in California, courts have ruled that insurance companies must cover residential
treatment for anorexia.
Judicial interpretation of the CMHPA has acknowledged residential treatment for
anorexia as medically necessary on multiple occasions. Courts recognized that parity is an
elusive concept, and that the legislature intended to leave room for flexibility in
interpretation.115 These interpretations have determined that there may not be a direct
analogue between physical health treatments and mental health treatments.116
For instance, in Rea v. Blue Shield, plaintiffs Marissa Rea and Kelly Melachouris
suffered from severe eating disorders.117 The respective medical providers of each plaintiff
advised that residential treatment was medically necessary for their eating disorders.118 The
plaintiffs sought coverage for medically necessary residential treatment for their eating
disorders from their insurance companies.119 The court in Rea concluded that residential
treatment for eating disorders must be covered by the insurance plan in question.120 The
court reasoned that the concept of parity does not require identical treatments for likely
dissimilar mental and physical illnesses.121 Rather, the court interpreted parity as mental
illnesses receiving the same quality of care afforded to physical illnesses.122 There may not
be a completely analogous treatment for physical illnesses and mental illnesses, thus
making the search for an identical treatment difficult or even impossible.123 The court
declared:
We do not interpret the concept of ‘parity’ to require treatments for mental
illnesses to be identical to those mandated for physical illnesses; rather,
given the principle that treatments for the two types of illnesses are in many
cases not comparable, parity instead requires treatment of mental illnesses
sufficient to reach the same quality of care afforded physical illnesses.124
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This broad interpretation of the medically necessary treatment upholds the California
legislature’s intent of parity.
Harlick v. Blue Shield provides an exemplary demonstration of courts reading the
medically necessary language of the CMHPA broadly.125 The plaintiff, Jeanne Harlick,
suffered from anorexia nervosa for over twenty years.126 At the time she sought treatment,
Harlick was only 65% of her ideal body weight.127 Her doctors decided that residential
treatment was medically necessary and that a lower level of care would not suffice.128
Harlick’s insurance company denied coverage claiming that the plan did not cover
residential treatment.129 Harlick filed suit seeking coverage for her residential treatment.130
Harlick’s plan had a categorical exclusion for residential treatment.131 However, her plan
covered sub-acute care in a skilled nursing facility.132
Harlick’s insurance company argued that residential treatment was not required to be
covered even if it were medically necessary. The CMHPA lists four categories of
potentially medically necessary care: outpatient services, inpatient hospital services, partial
hospital services, and prescription drugs.133 Noticeably, residential treatment is not listed.
The Harlick court determined that this list was illustrative, not exhaustive because of the
language “shall include” prior to enumerating the levels of care.134
The court ultimately declared that Harlick’s treatment was medically necessary, and
Harlick’s insurance plan fell within the scope of the CMHPA.135 The court also reasoned
those plans within the scope of the act must provide coverage for “all medically necessary
treatment” for “severe mental illness” under equal financial terms as physical illness.136
The court in Harlick elaborated:
Some medically necessary treatments for severe mental illness have no
analogue in treatments for physical illnesses. For example, it makes no
sense in a case such as Harlick’s to pay for time in a Skilled Nursing
Facility—which cannot effectively treat her anorexia nervosa—but not to
pay for time in a residential treatment facility that specializes in treating
eating disorders.137
Harlick and Rea exemplify expansive interpretations of mental health parity and courts
interpreting the MHPAEA should follow suit. This comprehensive view of the CMHPA
more closely achieves the goals of mental health parity.
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SIMILARITIES OF THE MHPAEA AND THE CMHPA

Despite the severity of anorexia, there has been a plethora of litigation surrounding
insurance coverage for residential treatment on both federal and state levels. Both the
CMHPA and the MHPAEA have the same goal—to establish parity in treatment of mental
illness and physical illness. Ultimately, Congress enacted the MHPAEA to build upon the
foundation laid by the MHPA and to eradicate the historical disparity in coverage between
mental health and physical health by insurance companies.138 The Departments were tasked
with outlining implementation through the interim final rules and the final rules.139
Courts have read the CMHPA broadly to include residential treatment as medically
necessary in appropriate circumstances. These expansive interpretations of the CMHPA
allow for vital treatment coverage, whereas a narrow interpretation would exclude certain
treatments. However, courts have not read the MHPAEA as broadly. A narrow reading of
the MHPAEA excluding residential treatment for anorexia would not achieve parity and
would be inconsistent with legislative intent. The MHPAEA should be read in a similar
way as the CMHPA to stay consistent with the overall legislative intent of achieving parity.
A. Medical Necessity
Through the guidance of interim final rules and the final rules, it is reasonable to
interpret the MHPAEA as requiring medically necessary treatment for all mental illness in
line with physical illness. The Departments have issued both the interim final rules and the
final rules to assist in the interpretation and implementation of the language of the
MHPAEA. As stated above, residential treatment is an effective and medically necessary
treatment in severe cases of anorexia. The language of the MHPAEA does not explicitly
require all medically necessary treatment for mental health in parity to medical/surgical
treatments as in the CMHPA.140
Through the interpretations in the interim final rules and the final rules, the
MHPAEA does require medically necessary treatment for mental health in parity with
medical/surgical treatments. However, the interim final rules and the final rules place
restrictions on the types of treatment limitations insurance companies may place on mental
healthcare. For instance, the interim final rules and the final rules require parity for
nonquantitative treatment limitations in medical/surgical benefits and mental health
benefits. Nonquantitative treatment limitations are not expressed numerically, but rather
limit in terms of scope or duration of benefits.141 Medical necessity is outlined in both the
interim final rules and the final rules as a nonquantitative treatment limitation. Thus, a
limitation based on medical necessity for mental health must be in parity to
medical/surgical limitations. Therefore, although the language of the CMHPA and
MHPAEA differ slightly, through the interim final rules and the final rules, both Acts
mandate the same form of parity. Thus, relevant courts should interpret the MHPAEA in
138
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line with how courts have interpreted the CMHPA. Overall, the MHPAEA should be read
to require all medically necessary treatment for mental health in parity with
medical/surgical benefits.
B. Classification of Treatment
The interim final rules and the final rules of the MHPAEA lay out six classifications
of care that require coverage: (1) inpatient, in-network, (2) inpatient, out-of-network, (3)
outpatient, in-network, (4) outpatient, out-of-network, (5) emergency care, and (6)
prescription drugs.142 These levels of classification are similar to those of the CMHPA,
which are outpatient services, inpatient hospital services, partial hospital services, and
prescription drugs. The Harlick court ruled that the list in the CMHPA is not exhaustive.
Within each classification listed, the MHPAEA declares that health plans are required to
implement the same treatment limitations for mental health conditions and
medical/surgical conditions.143 This means that health plans cannot implement a more
stringent standard for mental health conditions than for medical/surgical conditions.144
However, not all methods of treatment fall neatly into each classification. One treatment
method that has sparked significant litigation is residential treatment, an intermediate level
of care that does not fall into one of the six categories.
The final rules address the scope of the six classifications. They declare that
MHPAEA does not intend to completely exclude intermediate levels of care, such as
residential treatment.145 Under these rules, the MHPAEA does not plan for mental
healthcare to receive greater benefits than medical or surgical healthcare.146 Explicitly
stating in the final rules that the MHPAEA did not intentionally exclude intermediate levels
of care such as residential treatment implies that the list of six classifications are not
exhaustive.147 Similarly, the four levels of care outlined in the CMHPA are not
exhaustive.148 If the list of six classifications were exhaustive, the legislature would have
intended to prohibit intermediate levels of care such as residential treatment explicitly.
Therefore, residential treatment can qualify for parity in treatment with physical treatment.
Furthermore, providing residential treatment for eating disorders would not result in
those patients receiving greater benefits. These patients would only receive medically
necessary treatment, which is ultimately the same standard.149 As was the case in the
courts’ reasoning in Harlick and Rea, there may not be an analogue for anorexia treatment.
However, lack of a direct equivalent treatment does not mean those receiving coverage for
residential eating disorder treatment will get more significant benefits.
C. Nonquantitative Treatment
Just as in the CMHPA, the MHPAEA does not define medical necessity. However,
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the interim final rules and the final rules outline the intended interpretation of medical
necessity through regulations surrounding nonquantitative treatment limitations.
Nonquantitative treatment limitations are those that are not expressed numerically but
otherwise limited in terms of scope or duration of benefits.150 First, the interim final rules
and the final rules outline the intended implementation of nonquantitative treatment
limitations:
(4) Nonquantitative treatment limitations—(i) General rule. A group health
plan (or health insurance coverage) may not impose a nonquantitative
treatment limitation with respect to mental health or substance use disorder
benefits in any classification unless, under the terms of the plan (or health
insurance coverage) as written and in operation, any processes, strategies,
evidentiary standards, or other factors used in applying the nonquantitative
treatment limitation to mental health or substance use disorder benefits in
the classification are comparable to, and are applied no more stringently
than, the processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used
in applying the limitation with respect to medical/surgical benefits in the
classification.151
The key phrasing is that an insurance plan may not apply a nonquantitative treatment
limitation for “mental health or substance use disorder benefits in any classification,”
unless the limitations are “comparable to, and are applied no more stringently than, the
processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in applying the limitation
with respect to medical/surgical benefits in the classification.”152 This means that,
typically, an insurance plan may not impose a nonquantitative treatment limitation on
mental health benefits in any classification. This phrasing is important because it limits
insurance companies’ power to arbitrarily limit mental health coverage. However, an
exception to this general rule occurs when an insurance company places nonquantitative
treatment limitations on medical/surgical benefits. In this specific scenario, an insurance
company can place a nonquantitative treatment limitation on mental health benefits within
the same classification as the medical/surgical limitation. Nonquantitative treatment
limitations on mental health benefits must be applied in the same manner and no more
strictly than the comparable medical/surgical nonquantitative treatment limitations. Thus,
parity in application of nonquantitative treatment limitations is the exception to the general
rule of no nonquantitative treatment limitations.
The interim final rules list and the final rules sustain medical necessity as the first
example of a nonquantitative treatment limitation. Thus, under the MHPAEA, insurance
companies cannot make medically necessary limitations for mental illness unless there are
equivalent limitations for medical/surgical illness. To elaborate, if someone living with
anorexia has a heart attack or stroke, it is obvious that the treatment is medically necessary.
The patient may need hospitalization and care at a skilled nursing facility. If a person with
anorexia needs medically necessary treatment within the same treatment classification, this
treatment must be covered. This means that all medically necessary treatment within the
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same classification should be covered for mental illness if it is covered for physical illness.
Thus, parity in medically necessary treatment between mental health treatment and
medical/surgical treatment is mandated through the interim final rules and the final rules,
even though the MHPAEA language does not state this explicitly. Therefore, the
MHPAEA and the CMHPA mandate the same type of parity and should be interpreted in
the same manner.
VI.

INTERPRETATION OF THE MHPAEA

Currently, language of the MHPAEA requiring medical necessity has not been
interpreted as expansively as the CMHPA. For instance, in Kerry v. Anthem Blue Cross
Blue Shield, the plaintiff filed suit because their insurance company denied coverage for
residential treatment on a medical necessity basis, even though the plaintiff met medical
standards for medically necessary treatment.153 In other cases of physical illness, plaintiff
alleged the insurance company provided coverage for skilled nursing facilities with no
medical necessity basis.154 In Kerry, the defendants motion to dismiss was granted.155 This
decision conflicts with the legislative intent of the MHPAEA. Since the insurance company
provided coverage to skilled nursing facilities with no medically necessary restrictions, the
insurance company should have provided the same standard for residential treatment of
mental illness. Other courts have had similar interpretations of the MHPAEA.156 For
example, in Michael M. v. Nexsen Pruet Group Medical and Dental Plan, the plaintiff’s
insurance company claimed residential treatment for eating disorders was not medically
necessary.157 The plaintiff alleged an improper nonquantitative treatment limitation via
medical necessity. The plaintiff’s previous treatment facility declared that residential
treatment was medically necessary; however, the insurance company decided her treatment
was not medically necessary based on their own standards.158 The court outlined two
potential avenues for a MHPAEA violation.159 The first is a facial challenge of the plan
claiming it discriminates against mental health or substance abuse treatments in
comparison when compared to medical or surgical benefits.160 The second is an applied
challenge claiming that the same nonquantitative treatment was applied to both
medical/surgical benefits and mental health or substance use disorders, but the
nonquantitative treatment limitations were not applied in a comparable fashion.161
Unfortunately, both claims were denied by the court.162
For the first claim, the parties agree that residential treatment and skilled nursing
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facilities are comparable institutions.163 The nonquantitative treatment limitation is
applicable when the insurance company decides if residential treatment is medically
necessary. However, the plaintiff claimed that there was a violation of the MHPAEA due
to a difference in definition of residential treatment facility and skilled nursing facility.164
The court determined that the plan criteria was not more stringent for admission for a
residential treatment facility than that of a skilled nursing facility.165 This interpretation
fails to incorporate the legislature’s intent of providing the same treatment of residential
treatment facilities and skilled nursing facilities. Under the plan, a residential treatment
facility has to meet six separate qualifications:
1. Maintain permanent and full-time facilities for bed care of resident
patients, and
2. Have the services of a Psychiatrist (Addictionologist, when applicable)
or Physician extender available at all times and is responsible for the
diagnostic evaluation, provides face-to-face evaluation services with
documentation a minimum of once/week and PRN as indicated; and
3. Have a Physician or registered nurse (RN) present onsite who is in charge
of patient care along with one or more registered nurses (RNs) or licensed
practical nurses (LPNs) onsite at all times (24/7); and
4. Keep a daily medical record for each patient; and
5. Primarily provide a continuous structured therapeutic program
specifically designed to treat behavioral health disorders and is not
a group or boarding home, boarding or therapeutic school, half-way house,
sober living residence, wilderness camp or any other facility that provides
Custodial Care; and
6. Operate lawfully as a residential treatment center in the area where it is
located.166
Meanwhile, a skilled nursing facility only needed to be certified and licensed by an
appropriate agency.167 This is an inherently unequal standard. Residential treatment clearly
has a more restrictive qualifications as compared to skilled nursing facilities. Although the
parties stipulated that residential treatment and skilled nursing facilities are analogous, this
difference in standards exemplifies that they are in fact not analogous. If the court wanted
to be consistent with legislative intent, it should have found that the nonquantitative
treatment limitation of medical necessity on residential treatment was more restrictive than
that for medical/surgical benefits at a skilled nursing facility.
In the second claim, the plan denied plaintiff’s coverage at a residential treatment
center based on medical necessity and a requirement for acute behaviors and symptoms.168
The insurance company manual lists four criteria to evaluate admission into a skilled
nursing facility for medically necessary treatment:
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1. The member has an illness severe enough to require constant or frequent
skilled nursing care on a 24-hour basis that cannot be safely, efficiently,
or effectively provided in a home environment or outpatient basis;
and/or
2. The member is currently receiving inpatient hospital care, inpatient subacute care, or home skilled nurse visits exceeding 2 or more visits per
day; and/or
3. The admission to a skilled nursing facility will take the place of an
admission to or continued stay at a hospital or sub-acute facility; and/or
4. There is an expectation of sufficient improvement in the member’s
condition within a reasonable period of time that would permit the
member to be discharged home.169
However, between each of the four listed criteria, there is “and/or,” indicating that only
one of the four criteria needs to be met to be admitted to a skilled nursing facility for
medically necessary treatment.170 Only the first of the four criteria relate to the severity of
symptoms or illness; the other three do not. The fourth provision is a broad catchall option,
and a wide variety of conditions could be argued to meet it.171
However, residential treatment has no such standard and is entirely based on acute
severity and the need for 24-hour care. The court reasoned that because both standards
“require” 24-hour care, there is a comparable application.172 On the other hand, the
phrasing of the skilled nursing facility included “and/or,” meaning that 24-hour care was
not a requirement.173 Therefore, this was an unequal application. Basing the entire
admission of residential on severity of illness and need for acute physical care is an unequal
nonquantitative treatment limitation. Instead, the MHPAEA should be read as the CMHPA
to recognize that there may not be an analogous treatment for mental and physical health.
VII.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

More research is needed to understand the most effective method to treat anorexia.
Right now, the research is exceptionally limited. Studies with varied controls and variables
should be conducted at all levels of mental health treatment facilities. Further research
should be conducted as to the comparison and efficacy of treatments traditionally used for
physical illness when applied to mental illnesses. After all, a broken leg does not need the
same treatment as severe anorexia, but both conditions deserve the same quality of
treatment.
Given current knowledge and understanding, residential treatment can be medically
necessary and effective for severe anorexics. If future studies uncover a better treatment,
the same analysis applied to residential treatment in this Note should be applied to new
treatments. Additionally, more research should be done to determine whether utilizing BMI
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as a standard for eating disorder treatment is beneficial. BMI is a dated practice, and likely
does not measure the “severity” of an eating disorder accurately. However, not everyone
who requires eating disorder treatment has the same low BMI. Just because someone is
within the “normal” BMI range does not mean they are physically or mentally healthy.
In order to abide by the legislative intentions of parity, medical necessity in the
MHPAEA should be read broadly to include residential treatment for severe anorexics.
Residential anorexia treatment is medically necessary and should be determined by the
patient’s practitioner, despite an insurance plan’s classification. Anorexia has several fatal
consequences and should be analyzed under the same medical necessity standard as
physical illnesses.
In 2020, California amended the CMHPA to be even broader. The Harlick and Rea
courts both ruled that residential treatment must be covered under the CMHPA prior to
the 2020 amendment.174 However, after these seminal cases, insurance companies in
California continued to argue that the original CMHPA does not require medically
necessary residential treatment for mental health disorders.175 The 2020 amendment to
the CMHPA eliminates this argument by clarifying that insurers must cover all
intermediate levels of care, including residential treatment for mental health disorders.176
The relevant language of the 2020 amendment is as follows:
The benefits that shall be covered pursuant to this section shall include, but
not be limited to, the following . . . (2) Intermediate services, including the
full range of levels of care, including, but not limited to, residential
treatment, partial hospitalization, and intensive outpatient treatment.177
This is a step in the right direction. Statutory interpretation in line with what is written
in this Note would be sufficient. Overall, in an ideal world, Congress would amend the
MHPAEA to explicitly require treatment for all mental illnesses. Although, this is probably
an unrealistic goal at the present time, as it is very difficult to get Congress to amend
statutes. A more reasonable suggestion would be for Congress to amend the MHPAEA to
overtly define what medical necessity means.
CONCLUSION
Annually, eating disorders cost the United States economy an average of 64.7 billion
dollars.178 48.6 billion dollars of this amount was due to lost productivity (reduced
productivity at work, loss of earnings due to mortality, and reduced workforce
participation).179 This amount could be significantly reduced if patients received proper
treatment the first time, resulting in a reduction of subsequent costly treatments. In 2018–
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2019, the estimated annual cost because of lost productivity from deaths associated with
eating disorders was $8.8 billion.
Courts have embraced the underlying notion of parity and have interpreted the
CMHPA broadly to expand coverage for mental healthcare. The language of the CMHPA
and the MHPAEA differ slightly in terms of their explicit language. Although, through the
interim final rules and the final rules, the MHPAEA ultimately mandates the same type of
parity as the CMHPA; parity between medically necessary mental health treatment and
medical/surgical treatment. Thus, the CMHPA and the MHPAEA should be interpreted the
same as they aim to achieve the same goal. All mental illnesses should be treated the same
as physical illnesses, but given the severity of anorexia, equal treatment is essential. In
order to meet the legislature’s intent of parity between mental health treatment and
medical/surgical treatment, the MHPAEA should be read broadly to include residential
treatment as medically necessary in severe cases of anorexia.
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